Recht. Politisch. International. Gerne auch die Niederungen des Inneren.
so gesehen auf einem WC der juristischen Fakultät der Universität Augsburg:
BRD = GmbH -> kein anerkannter Staat [Antwort: Staatsvolk: Check, Staatsgebiet: Check, Staatsgewalt: Check, inklusive Verweis auf Degenhardt, Staatsrecht, S. 3)
– nicht souverän
-> kein gültiger Friedensvertrag seit ’45
-> Nachforschan
-> gegen die Schweigespirale
„the notion of precarious employment within international organizations is inherent in their evolving nature and, therefore, necessary for the survival of international organizations.
[…] We have seen that many international organizations’ employment practices are very similar, and that they often provide only relative, non-permanent employment guarantees. However, these apparently negative practices seem to benefit the overall functioning of these institutions. Nevertheless, the pursuit of precarious employment practices affects one of the core elements of international organizations’ esprit de corps — loyalty. The pernicious effects of weak or non-existent allegiance among international staff members create vulnerabilities for international organizations, which may reach the point that the relevant organization’s constitutional
objectives cannot be met.“
The Syrian government does not publish casualty figures by sect, but martyrs’ notices pasted on the walls in Jabal Alawia, the Alawite heartland in the hills east of the port of Latakia, indicate that the Alawites have suffered a disproportionate share of deaths in the war to preserve the Alawite president. A myth promulgated by the Sunni Islamist opposition is that the Alawites have been the main beneficiaries of forty-four years of Assad family rule over Syria, but evidence of Alawite wealth outside the presidential clan and entourage is hard to find. The meager peasant landholdings that marked the pre-Assad era are still the rule in Jabal Alawia, where most families live on the fruits of a few acres. Some Alawite merchants have done better in the seaside cities of Latakia and Tartous, but so have Sunni, Druze, and Christian businessmen. This may explain in part why, from my own observations, a considerable proportion of Syrian Sunnis, who comprise about 75 percent of the population, have not taken up arms against the regime. If they had, the regime would not have survived.
The rising number of Alawite young men killed or severely wounded while serving in the army and in regime-backed militias has led to resentment among people who have no choice other than to fight for President Assad and to keep their state’s institutions intact. Their survival, as long as Sunni jihadists kill them wherever they find them, requires them to support a regime that many of them oppose and blame for forcing them into this predicament.
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/nov/06/syria-we-dont-know/
In addition, there is new insight from VICE news, including the alliance between „moderates“ and Islamist groups in their recent advances against Assad’s troops:
Ralph Janik 